VZCZCXRO0363 PP RUEHROV DE RUEHTU #0492/01 1981619 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 171619Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6565 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TUNIS 000492

NOFORN

DEPT FOR NEA AA/S FELTMAN, DAS HUDSON, AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE GRAY, AND NEA/MAG FROM AMBASSADOR

EO 12958 DECL: 07/13/2029 TAGS PREL, PGOV, ECON, KPAO, MASS, PHUM, TS SUBJECT: TROUBLED TUNISIA: WHAT SHOULD WE DO?

Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for E.O. 12958 reasons 1.4 (b ) and (d).

Summary

11. (S/NF) By many measures, Tunisia should be a close US ally. But it is not. While we share some key values and the country has a strong reco

12. (S/NF) In the past three years, US Mission Tunis has responded by offering greater cooperation where the Tunisians say they want it, but no

The Backdrop: Historic Relations and Shared Values

13. (SBU) The United States and Tunisia have 200 years of close ties and common interests, including advancing regional peace, combating terror

- 14. (SBU) On foreign policy, Tunisia has long played a moderate role (although recently its goal has been to &get along with everyone8). The GC
- 15. (SBU) Finally, although Tunisians have been deeply angry over the war in Iraq and perceived US bias towards Israel, most still admire the & TUNIS 00000492 002 OF 005

scientific exchanges, and a belief in the American culture of innovation. Tunisians see these as important for their future.

The Problem: A Sclerotic Regime and Growing Corruption

16. (C) Despite Tunisia's economic and social progress, its record on political freedoms is poor. Tunisia is a police state, with little freedo

17. (C) The problem is clear: Tunisia has been ruled by the same president for 22 years. He has no successor. And, while President Ben Ali dese

US-Tunisian Relations: If Only We Would Say This Is Paradise

18. (S/NF) US-Tunisian relations reflect the realities of the Ben Ali regime. On the positive side, we have accomplished several goals in recer

19. (C) But we have also had too many failures. The GOT frequently declines to engage, and there have been too many lost opportunities. The GOT Most troubling has been the GOT's unilateral and clumsy effort to impose new and retroactive taxes on the American Cooperative School of Tunis.

- 110. (C) At the same time, the GOT has also increasingly tightened controls that make it exceptionally difficult for the US Mission to conduct
- 111. (C) Beyond the stifling bureaucratic controls, the GOT makes it difficult for the Mission to maintain contact with a TUNIS 00000492 003 OF
- 112. (C) Some of the GOT's actions may be related to its intense dislike of the former Administration's &freedom agenda.8 The GOT considered th

So, What Should We Do?

113. (C) Notwithstanding the frustrations of doing business here, we cannot write off Tunisia. We have too much at stake. We have an interest i

The Extended Hand

114. (C) Since President Obama's inauguration, Tunisians have been more receptive to the United States, Senior GOT officials have warmly welcom

How To Advance Democracy and Human Rights

- 115. (S) The Obama Administration creates an important opportunity, then, to explore whether and how to pursue a more productive bilateral rela
- 116. (C) We should consider how this policy objective is publicly manifested, however. For several years, the United States has been out in fro
- 117. (C) In addition, we should increase our efforts to persuade our European partners, and other like-minded countries, to step up their effor

Advancing Other US Interests

- 118. (C) Whether we succeed on democracy and human rights, the United States has an interest in building relations with a wide spectrum of Tuni
- 119. (C) In addition, we should offer serious engagement in high-priority areas for Tunisians that will also benefit the United States, includi -- more, and more comprehensive, English-language programs; -- Ph.D. scholarships for Tunisian students to study in the United States, such as
- 120. (C) In addition to talking to the GOT, we need to engage directly with the Tunisian people, especially youth. The Embassy is already using

Advancing Broader Foreign Policy Objectives And Security Cooperation

- 121. (C) We should also seek new ways to engage Tunisia in pursuit of our broader foreign policy agenda. We believe that the GOT would welcome
- 122. (S/NF) There are opportunities in the area of security cooperation, too. For starters, we know that Tunisia could be doing a better job in the threat of terrorism in North Africa. This was all too clear when, yet again, the GOT failed recently to share information with us in a time
- 123. (C) On military cooperation, the time has come to shift our military assistance away from FMF to more targeted programs that meet specific

Our Message: Deeper Cooperation Depends On Real Engagement

- 124. (S) Tunisia is not an ally today, but we still share important history and values. It is fair to consider Tunisia a friend, albeit cautiou
- 125. (S) To succeed, however, we need resources and commitment from Washington. New and expanded programs will require money and staff to imple 126. (S) Finally, we recommend US officials be clear in all meetings with Tunisians: more US cooperation depends on real Tunisian engagement. F

Godec